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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CHURCH EXPULSION
I now write that you must have nothing to do with any
so-called Christian who leads a loose life, or is grasping,
or idolatrous, a slanderer, a drunkard, or a swindler. You
should not even eat with any such person. What business
of mine is it to judge outsiders? God is their judge. You
are judges within the fellowship. Root out the evil-doer
from your community. I Cor. 5: 11-13
Churches often expel their brethren for one reason or another,
but not always fairly.' And in many of these instances the ex-
communicated member does not let the association's action remain
unchallenged. Banishment is often part of a larger intrachurch
dispute intensified by unusual bitterness, surpassing similar familial
wrangles in their vehemence and affording a glimpse of the larger
religious wars of the past.2  Because of the incongruity of these
battles, courts, when called upon to settle them, are generally
reluctant to step in and often flavor their opinions with lamentations
that the suit has its origin in a church.3 But they are repeatedly
asked to intercede, and the volume of cases alone indicates the
necessity of establishing a rule of law that maintains a proper
relation between church and state while balancing the interests of the
exiled member in seeking relief and the church in retaining maxi-
mum freedom of action.
Courts disagree on what action they may or should take when
a former member, expelled in violation of the church's rules and
practices, asks to be reinstated. Most jurisdictions have refused
relief, labeling the plaintiff's troubles damne absque injuria, but,
as is true of the courts that grant redress, their decisions have
usually been reached with a rather perfunctory analysis. While
1. A somewhat extreme example is David v. Carter, 222 S.W.2d 900 (Tex. Civ. App.
1949) which involved a Baptist minister whose adulterous affairs and arbitrary conduct
no doubt violated his church's precepts. The plaintiffs were summarily expelled at the
pastor's instigation at a meeting conducted by him with the aid of threats and a rifle.
2. In Clapp v. Krug, 232 Ky. 303, 22 S.W.2d 1025, 1029 (1929), the heat of the battle
prompted this comment: "In this instance it appears to an unbiased mind that the differ-
ences which have arisen and the bitterness that has been engendered have assumed a
magnitude out of all proportion to the initiatory causes, and the possibilities of spiritual
disaster and destructive effect are so grave as to call for the exercise of the Christian
graces of reconciliation, forbearance, brotherly love, and unity, according to the admonition
given by the Apostle Paul to the Church at Corinth."
3. See, e.g., Stansberry v. McCarthy, 238 Ind. 338, 149 N.E.2d 683 (1958); Ragsdale
v. Church of Christ in Eldora, 244 Iowa 474, 55 N.W.2d 539 (1953). The statement in
Munsel v. Boyd, 30 Ohio Cir. 182, 190 (1907) is typical: "This case has been a most
unfortunate controversy and it has developed into one of those bitter feuds that we
sometimes discover in bodies which should especially exemplify to the world that living
Christian spirit which was inculcated by the Master. It is a kind of case which the courts
dislike to approach ....
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some courts make no distinction between religious organizations
and other voluntary associations 4 most agree that churches stand
on a "higher plane," '5 and must be allowed a freer hand in their
internal affairs. Aside from this comment and a usually bland
affirmation of freedom of religion," there is little helpful analysis
of the problem, and almost no consideration is given to many im-
portant factors, such as the effect judicial supervision will have
on the church and what it can reasonably be expected to accomplish.
Orthodox methods of determining these cases are attacked occa-
sionally by the courts, but not always satisfactorily.7 Few com-
mentators have been attracted by the subject, but those that have
considered the matter have been fairly consistent in their dissatis-
faction with the traditional approaches.
8
THE TRADITIONAL VIEW
The majority of courts deny relief to an excommunicated church
member who alleges that he has been expelled in violation of the
organization's rules, practices, and customs, 9 and direct him back
to the church for relief.10 The most common ground for these
decisions is that because of our traditional notions of freedom of
religion and separation of church and state, the courts will not
decide ecclesiastical questions such as those relating to discipline."
Shannon v. Frost1 2 is the earliest and perhaps the foremost au-
thority for this rule. The policy of abstention from interference
with ecclesiastical affairs generally was firmly established by the
United States Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones,3 which relied in
part on Shannon. While the prohibition against judicial interference
enunciated in Watson is not a constitutional requirement, most
that what is being dealt with in church disputes is largely a per-
4. See Powanda v. Pido, 304 Pa. 42, 155 AtI. 90 (1931).
5. Nance v. Busby, 91 Tenn. 303, 18 S.W. 874, 879 (1892).
6. See, e.g., Brown v. Mount Olive Baptist Church, 124 N.W.2d 445 (Iowa 1963)
State ex rel. Soares v. Hebrew Congregation "Dispersed of Judah," 31 La. Ann. 205 (1879).
7. See Randolph v. First Baptist Church, 53 Ohio Op. 288, 120 N.E.2d 485 (1954).
8. ZOLLMANN, AMERICAN CHURCI-i LAW, §§ 325-327 (1933); Chaffee, The Internal
Affairs of Associations Not For Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993 (1930). Zollmann declares
that, "No one, lawyer or layman, can emerge from an attentive reading of the cases on this
subject but with a mind scratched and bleading and utterly bewildered by the Judicial
vagaries encountered." (§ 326). He concludes that because membership is a contract right,
courts should review church decisions to determine whether it followed its own rules. (§
328-40).
9. E.g., Mount Olive Primitive Baptist Church v. Patrick, 252 Ala. 672, 42 So. 2d 617
(1949); Stewart v. Jarriel, 206 Ga. 855, 59 S.E.2d 368 (1950); Kompier v. Thegza, 213
Ind. 542, 13 N.E.2d 229 (1938).
10. Thomas v. Lewis, 224 Ky. 307, 6 S.W.2d 255 (1928).
11. Hundley v. Collins, 131 Ala. 234, 32 So. 575 (1902) ; Brown v. Mount Olive Baptist
Church, supra note 6.
12. 42 Ky. (3 B. Mon.) 253 (1842).
13. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1871); "The right to organize voluntary religious
associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of [729] any religious doctrine,
and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the
association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the Individual members, congre-
gations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite them-
selves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to
submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of
such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the
secular courts and have them reversed."
14. The basis of jurisdiction of the matter was diversity. It involved a dispute in a
Presbyterian church in Kentucky over the church's stand regarding questions relating to
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sonal matter-the loss of fellowship and spiritual damage to the
courts have accepted it as an abstract proposition, even though it is
not always applied in the discipline cases as a ground for denying
review.
Aside from this reason, several other bases for refusing judicial
relief have been advanced. For example, it has been stated that
the breach will only be widened if the member is allowed to bring
the suit for reinstatement. 15  This contention seems to recognize
that what is being dealt with in church disputes is largely a per-
sonal matter-the loss of fellowship and spiritual damage to the
plaintiff. The loss of some remote right in the church property
or infringement of a nebulous contract can scarcely be the moti-
vation for most of these suits. Therefore, it is important for the
court to try to decide whether the dispute could be settled satis-
factorily to the plaintiff or to the church as a whole if the desired
relief were rendered. On one hand, if the association would not
admit that its action was hasty and unjust, passion might be steeped
and the banished member may find the relationship so unsatis-
factory that he would voluntarily quit the organization later. Even
if the church has only made a good faith mistake as to its procedure,
similar repercussions may result. Thus, the court in both instances
may find that its intervention has not only failed to be effective
but has compounded the member's troubles by making a voluntary
reconciliation unlikely. On the other hand, the dignity of a court's
judgment may cause a reconsideration and admission that the dis-
missal proceedings were neither politic nor wise, and if the member
is afforded a hearing, he may be able to convince the church
that it should not displace him.
It has been pointed out that determinations of what procedures
must be followed by the church when expelling a member should
be left conclusively to church tribunals because they are better
able to discern them.18 Thus, if the rule is adopted that the church
must follow its own procedures in excommunicating a member,
the court may find itself making law for the association in cases
where the practices and customs are difficult to ascertain; 17 a gen-
the Civil War, and the majority had been declared entitled to the property by the General
Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States. The Supreme Court affirmed
the Circuit Court, holding that all civil courts were precluded by the Assembly's determ-
ination. See Comment, 43 CALip. L. REv. 322 (1955) for a discussion of this question.
15. Jenkins v. New Shiloh Baptist Church, 189 Md. 512, 56 A.2d 788 (1948).
16. State ex rel. Hatfield v. Cummins, 171 Ind. 112, 85 N.E. 359 (1908) ; Hendryx V.
People's United Church, 42 Wash. 336, 84 Pac. 1123 (1960) ; accord, Watson v. Jones,
supra note 13, reasoning that the appeal would be from a learned tribunal to one which
Is less so.
17. Roscoe Pound aptly points out the Inherent difficulties In construing church law
In Bonacum v. Harrington, 65 Neb. 831, 91 N.W. 886, 887 (1902): "In order to reach a
sound construction on controverted points, the court should be able to enter into and give
effect to the reason and Intention of the lawgivers. It must know the general spirit of
the organization, and its attitude towards Its governing authorities,-whether it construes
the laws relating to their powers liberally or strictly; and It must consider the construc-
tion, If any, which usage and common consent has determined. . . . In such a case as
this there would be great danger that the ideas of the court would run counter to those
of the fathers of the church, [888] and make laws by construction which were never in-
tentionally adopted." Comment, 13 CoRNZLLa L, Q. 464 (1928).
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erally unacceptable result. 8 This probably would occur most often
in cases involving the churches having a congregational rather
than a presbyterian or hierarchical form of government 9 since
the former are likely to be more loosely organized and are less
likely to have readily accessible and clear formulations of excom-
munication procedure. 20  This, and the fact that most of these
cases arise in the independent churches, adds significance to this
conclusion.
A few decisions are based on the theory that the member
agreed, by contract, to be subject to the association's disciplinary
procedure when he entered the fold and therefore cannot object
to its exercise, even if the church tribunal acts arbitrarily. 2' This
approach has been severely criticized for its artificiality. 2   Finally,
the reluctance to act in these cases seems to stem in part from
the common law rule that equity acts only to protect property
rights, and will not enforce rights of personality.2 3 The trend
today, however, is away from this rigid proposition2 4 so it is no
longer a valid reason for denying relief.
The rule that courts will not review expulsion from religious
societies is subject to the qualification that relief will be granted
if a civil or property right is involved.25  (In this context, the terms
civil and property are used in opposition to spiritual or ecclesias-
tical rights.2 6 ) Although it is not clear what the rule encompasses,
it is generally accepted that membership itself is not such an
interest as will be protected.2 7  There are some exceptions, how-
ever, and notable among these is Randolph v. First Baptist Church2 8
18. But see Rock Dell Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran Congregation v. Mommsen,
174 Minn. 207, 219 N.W. 88 (1928), wherein the court held membership is a property
right and notice and hearing must be afforded even if not provided for by the church's
rules and practices.
19. The totality of denominations have been categorized into three basic groups in
reference to their form of government: (1) in. the heirarchical or prelatical form, the
governing power is in the higher clergy, to which form Is assigned, among others, the
Roman Catholic Church. (2) The power in the presbyterian form resides in assemblies,
synods, presbyteries and sessions. The Lutheran and Presbyterian polities are examples
of this type. (3) In the congregational or independent form, the congregation is supreme,
and assigned to this group are the Baptist and Congregational churches, among others.
Thomas v. Lewis, aupra note 10; 7 BAYLOR L. REV. 425 (1955).
20. See Mount Olive Primitive Baptist Church v. Patrick, supra note 9 ; Evans v. Criss,
39 Misc. 314, 240 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Both of these cases involved conflicting
interpretations of Baptist expulsion procedure.
21. Partin v. Tucker, 126 Fla. 817, 172 So. 89 (1937); Kompler v. Thegza, 213 Ind.
542, 13 N.E.2d 229 (1938).
22. Chaffee, 8upra note 8.
23. See Stewart v. Jarriel, 206 Ga. 855, 59 S.E.2d 368 (1950). Gee v. Pritchard, 2
Swans. 403, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818) is the landmark case for this rule.
24. Comment, 11 WAsH. & LEE I,. REV. 74 (1954). A leading case indicating this trend
is Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 30 Cal. 2d 110, 180 P.2d 321, 325 (1947), wherein
the court stated: "The issue should not in logic or justice turn upon the sole proposition
that a personal rather than a property right is involved. To so reason, is to place
property rights in a more favorable position than personal rights, a doctrine wholly at
odds with the fundamental principles of democracy."
25. E.g., Caples v. Nazareth Church of Hopewell Ass'n, 245 Ala. 656, 18 So. 2d 383
(1944) ; Western Conference of Original Free Will Baptists v. Creech, 256 N.C. 128, 123
S.E.2d 619 (1962).
26. See Partin v. Tucker, supra note 21.
27. Hundley v. Collins, 131 Ala. 234, 32 So. 575 (1902) ; Stewart v. Jarriel, asupra note
23. Contra, Rock Dell Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran Congregation v. Mommsen, supra
note 18.
28. 53 Ohio Op. 288, 120 N.E.2d 485 (1954).
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where the court rejected the prevailing view in giving relief to the
plaintiff who had been expelled without notice and hearing in viola-
tion of the rules of the church. The opinion reasoned that "nowhere
is any basis presented for the dogmatic conclusion, that expulsion
from a church does not involve civil or property rights. ' 29 The
court found a property right existing in a possible division of the
assests upon dissolution of the organization; a ground which one
writer has concluded is too speculative and remote to serve as
a sufficient basis for determining rights of these litigants.80 Al-
though bluntly in opposition to orthodoxy, this court's analysis
seems deficient in that it does not approach the true nature of the
problem, i. e., that membership is a matter of human r e I a t i o n s
and not property interests. It should be dealt with as such. Little
is gained by straining old concepts to include things that simply do
not fit. It appears the real significance of the opinion is that even
though there is an unwillingness to abandon established principles,
there is a tendency to broaden the concept of "civil rights. '""
This trend is also evident in litigation involving expelled min-
isters and church officers who are receiving pecuniary benefits
for their services. Most courts now find a protected civil right in a
salaried office32 or ministry,8 although some of the older opinions
maintain a strict point of view as to the pastor.38 The attitude
still prevails, however, that an unsalaried office is not within the
meaning of the rule. 3 This position extends to instances where
the church and the church corporation are distinct entities and
the office held in the temporal corporation is dependent upon mem-
bership in the ecclesiastical body from which the plaintiff claims
he has been wrongfully banished-.3 6
While it can be observed that the majority view gives the
church wide latitude in their internal affairs, some limitations are
imposed upon the rule. The most important of these is the maxim,
accepted by almost all courts, that the proceedings will be examined
to determine whether the entity causing the expulsion had authority
to act.3 T Thus, in the independent or congregational church where
the majority, subject to no higher authority, makes the final de-
termination," consideration will be given to whether more than
29. Id. at 488.
30. Chaffee, supra note 8, at 999.
31. See generally Comment, 11 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 74 (1954).
32. Clapp v. Krug, 232 Ky. 303, 22 S.W.2d 1025 (1929).
33. Evans v. Criss, 39 Misc. 314, 240 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
34. See Travers v. Abbey, 104 Tenn. 665, 58 S.W. 247 (1900) (no property right where
pastor was supported only by voluntary contributions) ; State ex rel. Hatfield v. Cummins,
171 Ind. 112, 85 N.E. 359 (1908).
35. Everett v. First Baptist Church, 6 N.J. Misc. 640, 142 At. 428 (1928) (deacon).
36. Hundley v. Collins, supra note 27. See Willis v. Davis, 323 S.W.2d 847 (1959),
discussing the distinction between the ecclesiastical society having jurisdiction of the
spiritual affairs, and the civil corporation having jurisdiction of the secular affairs.
37. E.g., Caples v. Nazareth Church of Hopewell Ass'n, 245 Ala. 656, 18 So. 2d 883
(1944); Ragsdale v. Church of Christ, 244 Iowa 474, 55 N.W.2d 539 (1953); Trustees
of Oak Grove Missionary Baptist Church v. Ward, 261 Ky. 42, 86 S.W.2d 1051 (1935).
38. Supra note 19.
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half did act, and if not, the member will be reinstated. 89 Applying
this rule, it was held in Bouldin v. Alexander"0 that fifteen members
of an independent church could not expel forty-one others; a minority
is without authority to expel a majority and such action is absolutely
void. It has been held that the court will give conclusive weight
to the church tribunal's decision as to its own jurisdiction to expel 4 1
and the North Dakota Supreme Court, by way of dictum, has
intimated that it will accept this position.42
As an additional limitation, courts under the majority rule will
reinstate the plaintiff if fraud is involved. In Hendryx v. People's
United Church,43 the expelled members of the congregation sued to
set aside a conveyance of church property to a third party. The
defendant pastor had caused the sale as part of a fraudulent scheme
to gain control of the property for his own benefit. All who op-
posed him, in the course of events leading up to the transaction,
were summarily expelled. The court held the expulsions void be-
cause of fraud, stating that even though it would not decide ecclesi-
astical questions, it would reinstate the expelled members and
entertain the action to prevent the defendants from wrongfully
obtaining control of the property and diverting it to uses inconsistent
with those existing when it was obtained. The court posed the
question in this way:
[C]an a man or set of men, or a majority of the church
organization, by chicanery, deceit, and fraud, divert the
property of a church organization to a purpose entirely
foreign to the purposes of the organization, for their own
selfish benefit, whether by the expulsion of members or in
any other fraudulent manner?44
While this case, strictly speaking, was an expulsion case, it seems
that the desired relief was granted on a basis analogous to that
adopted in instances where a schism within the church is involved.45
In these cases, it is generally accepted that although theological
questions will not be decided, disputes as to the property will.
Therefore, in instances where the congregation divides over any
matter, ecclesiastical or otherwise, each claiming title to the prop-
erty, the court will determine which faction adheres to the tenets
and doctrine subscribed to when the church originated and award
the property to that group in order to prevent a diversion to in-
39. Supra note 37.
40. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872).
41. Kuns v. Iobertson, 154 I1. 394, 40 N.E. 343 (1895).
42. Bendewald v. Ley, 39 N.D. 272, 168 N.W. 693 (1918).
43. 42 Wash. 336, 84 Pac. 1123 (1906).
44. Id. at 1127.
46. A schism is defined in Lindstrom v. Tell, 131 Minn. 203, 154 N.W. 969, 971 (1916)
as "a separation in a church occasioned usually by diversity of opinion on religious sub-
jects. . . . Separation by reason of a schism is not like expulsion or excommunication.
Those terms necessarily involve involuntary and compulsory separation of members, a
schism arises from voluntary secession."
NoTEs
consistent uses."6 The church's doctrine cannot be modified over
objection of the minority, no matter how small. Hendryx seems
to be the only case where the fraud argument has been used to
void an expulsion, although a few courts have stated it is a ground
for reinstatement. 47  This seems to indicate that the argument's
application is limited to factional-like disputes to serve as a basis
for preventing improper diversion. The prohibition, in the schism
cases, against depriving objecting members of the use of the prop-
erty by changing doctrines or customs also explains the rule that
the church cannot change its original doctrine and make the accept-
ance of that alteration a condition of continued membership. 4"
Going beyond the property concepts, some courts have stated
or inferred that the proceedings will be examined to determine
whether the member was banished in bad faith.4 9  This is un-
doubtedly inconsistent with the majority view, and, accordingly,
the courts accepting the prevailing rule have rejected this as a
basis for review.50 Others, however, have decided to the contrary.51
THE MINORITY VIEW
Taking a more liberal approach, some courts hold that church
expulsion proceedings will be reviewed to determine whether the
proceedings complied with the rules and practices of the organiza-
tion; 5 2 if not, the member will be reinstated. Some of these decisions
have been based on the contractual theory that an excommunicated
member, upon being admitted to the society, has agreed to the
dismissal proceedings, provided those rules will be followed by the
church. 53  A few courts have justified review on the finding of a
property right existing in membership itself; 54 others discover such
an interest in a share of the assets upon a future dissolution.
55
46. E.g., Yanthis v. Kemp, 43 Ind. App. 203, 85 N.E. 976 (1908), aff'd on rehearing 43
Ind. App. 203, 86 N.E. 451 (1908) (use of property for Immoral purposes) ; Maynard v.
Headen, 334 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. 1960); Presbytery of Bismarck v. Allen, 74 N.D. 400, 22
N.W.2d 625 (1946) (dictum). See generally Note, Judicial Intervention In Disputes Over
Use of Church Property, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1142 (1962). It has been pointed out that the
rule may inhibit the natural development of church doctrine inasmuch as a strict appli-
cation of the -rule will make it possible for any member of the association to prevent even
a slight modification of custom which is agreeable to the rest of the members. Id. at 1174.
Apparently aware of this, some courts have noted the necessity of intellectual freedom and
seem to take a more liberal approach to doctrinal change. See Partin v. Tucker, 126 Fla.
817, 172 So. 89 (1937).
47. First Free Will Baptist Church v. Franklin, 148 Fla. 277, 4 So. 2d 390 (1941)
Murr v. Maxwell, 232 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. App. 1950).
48. Christian Church v. Carpenter, 108 Iowa 647, 79 N.W. 375 (1899); Trustees of
East Norway Lake Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Halvorson, 42 Minn. 503,
44 N.W. 663 (1890).
49. Erickson v. Gospel Foundation of California, 43 Cal. 2d 581, 275 P.2d 474 (1954)
Dittemore v. Dickey, 249 Mass. 95, 144 N.E. 57 (1924).
50. Clapp v. Krug, 232 Ky. 303, 22 S.W.2d 1025 (1929).
51. Partin v. Tucker, supra note 46, seems to have overruled First Free Will Baptist
Church v. Franklin, supra note 47 as to this point.
52. E.g., Taylor v. Jackson, 273 Fed. 345 (D.C. Cir. 1921); Longmeyer v. Payne, 205
S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947) ; Kaminski v. Hoynak, 373 Pa. 194, 95 A.2d 548 (1953).
53. Blauert v. Schupmann, 241 Minn. 447, 63 N.W.2d 578 (1954).
54. Rock Dell Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran Congregation v. Mommsen, 174 Minn.
207, 219 N.W. 88 (1928).
55. Randolph v. First Baptist Church, 53 Ohio Op. 288, 120 N.E.2d 485 (1954) ; see
Longmeyer v. Payne, &upra note 52.
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Both grounds seem rather remote. The adherence to the minority
view in Massachusetts apparently stems from its unique history
of government and church relations, specifically, the state supported
church
s
An occasional jurisdiction will go beyond the requisite com-
pliance with the church's own practices, and test the expulsion
proceedings by their own concepts of fairness or common justice
in cases where there are no established procedures, or where they
are deemed inadequate 7 This concept was established in Massa-
chusetts in Gray v. Christian Society 5 8 wherein the court held in-
valid a by-law providing for termination of membership for failure
to contribute for one year or for dicontinuance of "regular" worship.
Justice Holmes declared that these factual determinations could
not be left to a single moderator, as provided, but because they
were judicial questions, could only be decided by the society acting
as a group after giving due notice and hearing.59
This imposition of the court's own notions of fairness has cor-
rectly received the criticism that while courts "may be confident
that enforcement of the group's rules will not interfere with its
functioning, they can in no way be certain that a judicially formu-
lated rule will be tailored to fit the group's needs. '60 The question
of the common justice standard quite clearly illustrates the bare
bones of the majority and minority controversy. By an objective
analyzation, the variance in these cases seems to descend from
an irreconcilable and traditional clash in basic political theory: on
the one hand, the contention of the Pluralist philosophy that the
government, in order to bring about the greatest good, should allow
private groups maximum freedom; and on the other, the view of
the idealists that the most benefit to society as a whole can be
assured by allowing the government to regulate all areas of activity,
since the will of the state seeks only the common good.61 It is the
Pluralist concept that has prevailed in this country since its origin,
56. See Taylor v. Edson, 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 522, 525 (1849) wherein the court stated:
"The law of this commonwealth regulating religious societies, and defining the privileges
as well as liabilities of individual members of such associations, must be found in our
peculiar local history and usages, in our constitution, and the various statutes enacted
by the legislature, from time to time, rather than in any general principles contained in
the elementary books relating to corporations generally."
57. Rock Dell Norwegian Evangelical Lutheran Congregation v. Mommsen, supra note
54; Powanda v. PIdo, 304 Pa. 42, 155 Atl. 90 (1931). Contra, Bonacum v. Harrington, 65
Neb. 831, 91 N.W. 886 (1902).
58. 137 Mass. 329 (1884).
59. The Gray case was distinguished In Dittemore v. Dickey, 249 Mass. 95, 144 N.E.
57 (1924) wherein it was held that no notice and hearing need be given if the rules of
the society so provide and if the removal depends on an executive or administrative de-
cision, and not on the decision of a Judicial or quasi-judicial question wherein definite
facts must be ascertained. Although not necessary to the decision in that no authority
for arbitrary expulsion existed, a broader rule-without the qualification as to judicial
questions in Dittemore-is found in Moustakis v. Hellenic Orthodox Society, 261 Mass.
462, 159 N.E. 453 (1928).
60. Note, Judicial Control of Actions of Private Associations, 76 HAxv. L. REv. 983,
995 (1963).
61. See id. at 986-90 for a short and to the Point discussion of these concepts. Chaffee,
supra note 8 concludes with this observation. See generally, Losos, Courts and the Churches
In Missouri: A Survey of Missouri Law On Intra-Church Disputes With Reference To
the Political Theory of the Pluralists, 1956 WAsH. U.L.Q. 67.
NOTES
but the ascending complexity of our society has initiated some
recent dissatisfaction with the ramifications of that attitude.62 Al-
though the expulsion cases do not refer to this dichotomy, it seems
to be the most succinct explanation of them. The many reasons
that have been used as bases for decision by the courts seem
unsatisfactory; contract, property, separation of church and state,
and many other concepts are simply inadequate. While it must be
conceded that consideration of the Pluralist-idealist split alone will
not provide a solution to the vexing problem of how the courts
,should deal with church discipline, it can serve as an excellent
starting point for formulation of a correct standard.
The common fairness approach comes within the idealistic view-
point and is followed by only a few courts. It also represents the
greatest degree of interference with the churches' internal affairs,
for it is accepted in jurisdictions following it, and in others, that
the court will not look beyond matters of procedure to examine
the merits of the case.6 3 Whether grounds actually existed for the
excommunication is a question exclusively for the church. As an
additional limitation, no relief is granted in the minority states
until all available remedies within the organization are exhausted.6 4
This rule will usually be inapplicable since most of these cases
arise in the independent church where there is ordinarily no higher
tribunal, to which an appeal can be taken, than the majority.
CONCLUSION
Excommunication from a church means loss of the oppor-
tunity to worship God in familiar surroundings with a
cherished ritual, and inflicts upon the devout believer loneli-
ness of spirit and perhaps the dread of eternal damnation. 65
Certainly the exiled member's predicament must often appeal
to a court's sympathy. The feeling of natural justice is grated by
the arbitrary severance of so serious an attachment, at least where
the plaintiff is a devout believer who has been wronged by an
impetuous congregation acting on insufficient grounds. Perhaps it
is true that a good many of these cases do not contain such obvious
injustice-maybe the plaintiff rightfully deserves his damnation.
But even so, there are other important factors to be considered
in resolving the issue.
When the court orders the church to reinstate the member, it is
regulating its internal affairs. That, prima facie, is undesirable from
the Pluralist point of view, and in the absence of an interest which
62. Note, supra note 60 at 987.
63. Canadian Religious Ass'n v. 'Parmenter, 180 Mass. 415, 62 N.E. 740 (1902).
64. Knauss v. Seventh-Day Adventist Ass'n, 117 Colo. 540, 190 P.2d 590 (1948) ; State
v. Ellis, 140 So. 2d 194 (La. 1962); accord, Bendewald v. Ley, 39 N.D. 272, 168 N.W.
693 (1918).
65. Chaffee, supra note 8, at 998.
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will be affected by excommunication, and which is of the type
traditionally held legally cognizable, abstention is dictated to the
courts of conservative tendencies. From the idealistic standpoint
the judiciary's hand is not stayed on the basis of these factors.
But when the judge who leans toward this concept arrives at this
point, he must consider other elements and balance them against
the plaintiff's deprivation.
Even if the court steps in, can it give satisfactory relief to
the plaintiff? Will he simply be expelled again,6 6 this time in ac-
cordance with the proper procedure, and if not, will he desire to
continue the relationship if it lacks the warmth of good fellowship,
an element as basic a reason as any other for joining or staying
in a church? Perhaps this is too pessimistic a view of church
personality, but it seems important that a court examine these
things and concern itself with its own capabilities and the disrup-
tive effect judicial interference may have on the group. Moreover,
church litigation should not be encouraged. While adoption of the
minority view may cause a church to make certain its procedures
are followed in order to prevent a lawsuit with the people it expels,
it is conceivable that even this action will not always lessen the
likelihood of the congregation defending itself in court. In many
churches there may be honest dispute as to what procedure is
required for putting out a member, and so the group may be forced
to accept the presence of the plaintiff even if there has been a
good faith effort to deal with him as fairly as is required.
7
The majority appears to be the better view. But no matter
which position is accepted by the courts, their decisions in these
cases should be based on a consideration of all the factors in-
volved, rather than on stare decisis alone.
LELAND F. HAGEN
66. This is what happened in Longmeyer v. Payne, 205 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947).
After the expelled plaintiff was reinstated by the court, the church took great pains to
ascertain what its rules of expulsion were and finally succeeded in ridding itself of the
Plaintiff the second time around.
67. See Evans v. Criss, 39 Misc. 2d 314, 240 N.Y.S.2d 517 (Sup. Ct. 1963). The church
voted by a majority of one hundred twenty to two to expel the plaintiff minister after
giving notice and hearing, but the court ordered him reinstated after determining from
all the evidence that it was a church custom to discuss the matter at two meetings before
voting on it.
